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Abstract. Identity fraud (IDF) may be de¯ned as unauthorized ex-
ploitation of credential information through the use of false identity. We
propose CROO, a universal (i.e. generic) infrastructure and protocol to
either prevent IDF (by detecting attempts thereof), or limit its con-
sequences (by identifying cases of previously undetected IDF). CROO is
a capture resilient one-time password scheme, whereby each user must
carry a personal trusted device used to generate one-time passwords
(OTPs) veri¯ed by online trusted parties. Multiple trusted parties may
be used for increased scalability. OTPs can be used regardless of a trans-
action's purpose (e.g. user authentication or ¯nancial payment), asso-
ciated credentials, and online or on-site nature; this makes CROO a uni-
versal scheme. OTPs are not sent in cleartext; they are used as keys to
compute MACs of hashed transaction information, in a manner allowing
OTP-verifying parties to con¯rm that given user credentials (i.e. OTP-
keyed MACs) correspond to claimed hashed transaction details. Hashing
transaction details increases user privacy. Each OTP is generated from
a PIN-encrypted non-veri¯able key; this makes users' devices resilient
to o®-line PIN-guessing attacks. CROO's credentials can be formatted as
existing user credentials (e.g. credit cards or driver's licenses).
1 Introduction
We informally de¯ne identity fraud (IDF)1 as unauthorized exploitation of ex-
tracted credential information (e.g. identi¯cation passwords, driver's licence num-
bers, and credit card numbers) involving some form of impersonation or misrep-
resentation of identity. A 2005 survey [25] reported that over 9 million Americans
(i.e. one in 23 American adults) were IDF victims in 2004, corresponding to a
total annual cost of $51.4 billion and a median cost of $750 per victim. The
motivation behind IDF is multifaceted and the possible damages are diverse (in-
cluding, e.g., loss of privacy, worry and fear, ¯nancial loss, time loss, denial of
service,2 and public discredit).
In the academic literature, there are relatively few proposals addressing IDF.
Most focus on prevention of credential information extraction. (See, e.g. [3,4,14,
26], for countermeasures to phishing or key logging.) We are aware of only one
1 We prefer this term over \identity theft" (IDT), although both have often been
used [6,9,17]. The term theft seems to suggest that victims are \deprived" of their
identity, which is not always true, nor our focus.
2 IDF victims have been arrested due to fraud committed by their impersonators under
the victims' names.non-application-speci¯c academic proposal addressing generic IDF [31], which, as
presented, has limitations including restriction to on-site (vs. online) transactions
and loss of user location privacy (users are geographically tracked).
In this paper, we focus on IDF involving real (vs. ¯ctitious) people's identities.
We also include consideration of IDF involving newly created credentials (e.g.
credit, health, and building access cards) obtained by fraudsters in their victims'
names, because this type of IDF currently seems di±cult to detect. Our focus
is on the generic IDF problem, and we seek a universal IDF solution, i.e. one
which works for both remote and on-site transactions, and is neither application-
speci¯c, nor restricted to instances (of the generic IDF problem) associated with
one class of credential tokens (e.g. credit cards). Credential-speci¯c solutions
are potentially what individual applications' (e.g. credit card) vendors are likely
to propose; we believe end-users will ¯nd universal solutions both more usable
(when considered across all applications), and less costly in terms of personal
time. One might also argue that, for overall economic reasons, an IDF solution
detecting driver's license and health/debit/credit card-based forms of IDF is
more likely to be adopted and accepted by card bearers and state and ¯nancial
institutions than solutions which only detect one of these forms of IDF. While we
deal with architectural problems associated with the design of privacy-preserving
credential management systems, our primary focus is not the privacy aspect of
such systems, but their fraud detection capability. Similarly, we do not aim to
solve the bootstrap problem of human identi¯cation at the time when credentials
are issued to people. Instead, we assume that trusted parties exist that can
identify legitimate users (e.g. using out-of-band mechanisms), and we focus on
the detection of fraudulent uses of credentials.
We propose a universal infrastructure and protocol for IDF detection, which
we call CROO (Capture Resilient Online One-time password scheme). Each user
must carry a personal device used to generate one-time passwords (OTPs) veri-
¯ed by online trusted parties. These OTP generation and veri¯cation procedures
are universal, in the sense that they can be associated with any user transaction,
regardless of the transaction's purpose (e.g. user identi¯cation, user authentica-
tion, or ¯nancial payment), associated credentials (e.g. driver's license or credit
card), and online or on-site (e.g. point-of-sale) nature. For increased scalablity,
multiple OTP veri¯cation parties may be used (see x2.5). OTPs are not sent in
cleartext; they are used as keys to compute MACs of hashed unique transac-
tion information (e.g. list of bought items). This allows OTP-verifying parties
to con¯rm that given user credentials (i.e. OTP-based MACs) correspond to
claimed hashed transaction details. Hashing transaction information increases
user privacy. Online OTP-verifying parties detect IDF when OTPs of received
user credentials or the associated transaction information do not have expected
values. Each OTP is generated from a high-entropy non-veri¯able text [19] en-
crypted using a key derived from a user-chosen PIN; hence, possession of a user's
personal device (or clone thereof) does not su±ce to con¯rm guesses of the as-
sociated PIN, to recover the associated non-veri¯able key, and generate correct
OTPs. Since OTPs can only be veri¯ed by online parties, the proposed schemeturns o®-line PIN guessing attacks against stolen or cloned personal devices into
online OTP-guessing attacks that can be easily detected by online parties.
CROO provides means to both prevent IDF (by detecting IDF attempts), and
limit its consequences when sophisticated IDF attacks have bypassed the afore-
mentioned preventive measures. Limiting the consequences of IDF is of use when
a fraudster has acquired a user's PIN, stolen the user's personal device, and used
the device to generate correct OTPs for unauthorized transactions. Another in-
teresting aspect of CROO is that it requires few changes to existing credential pro-
cessing protocols: users continue to interact with relying parties; relying parties
continue to interact with users and card issuers; and the proposed OTP-based
user credentials can be customized to follow existing formats (e.g. the credit card
numbering format). To achieve this, CROO requires card issuers to interact with
both relying parties and proposed online OTP-verifying parties. For space and
processing speed e±ciency, CROO employs MACs (vs. encryption or public-key
signature) to generate user credentials. From a practical standpoint, users em-
ploy personal devices to generate OTP-based credentials which can be used in
the same way existing credentials are used. To generate OTPs, personal devices
must receive transaction details (e.g. a dollar amount and relying party's iden-
ti¯er). These details can be communicated either by manual keyboard entry, or
via short-range wireless communication with local terminals (e.g. by waiving the
personal device before a transceiver linked to a local terminal).
CROO relies on malware-free personal devices in which secrets used to generate
OTPs are stored. As others [8,22], we believe that, in the near future, a subset
of deployed personal devices will meet this requirement, possibly as a result of
initiatives such as the Trusted Computing Group [2].
Contributions. The proposal of a universal infrastructure and protocol for
addressing IDF is our main contribution. Universal here means designed to be
simultaneously used with multiple classes of user transactions, i.e. regardless of
transactions' applications, on-site or remote nature, purposes, attributes, and
associated credentials. We analyze the proposed scheme using criteria grouped
into categories of usability, privacy, fraud detection, and communication security.
The diversity and number of these criteria re°ect the challenge in designing
universal IDF detection systems.
Outline. x2 describes CROO. x3 presents evaluation criteria to facilitate analysis
and comparison of CROO with other proposals. x4 discusses related work. x5
concludes the paper.
2 Infrastructure and Protocol for IDF Detection
This section describes CROO, an infrastructure and protocol for IDF detection.
2.1 Fundamental De¯nitions
Before presenting CROO, we de¯ne a few terms related to IDF. In this paper:
identity (ID) denotes a collection of characteristics by which a person is known
(an individual may have more than one identity); identi¯er refers to any label as-
signed to an identity to distinguish this identity from other identities; credentialinformation (cred-info) denotes information (or a piece thereof) presented by a
party to either gain privileges or goods, or to support the veracity of an identity-
related claim made by this party; and credential token (cred-token) refers to an
object (tangible or electronic) on which cred-info is recorded.
2.2 Architectural Components
Parties. Let I be a party that issues cred-tokens and authorizes, when needed,
the execution of operations associated with cred-tokens issued by I. (For ex-
ample, I may be a credit card company that issues credit cards and authorizes
payments made with these cards.) Let F be a party that monitors the use of
cred-tokens, and can assign identi¯ers to a person U. (In some practical instanti-
ations, F may be a sub-component of party I, and/or the two may be co-located.)
Assume that I issues a cred-token CU to U, and let R be a party that provides
goods or services to any person or organisation A, when the following conditions
are satis¯ed: (1) A presents to R either certain cred-tokens (e.g. a credit card)
or pieces of cred-info (e.g. a credit card number and a name); and (2) either the
items presented to R grant A required privileges, or con¯rm that A has required
attributes (e.g. is of a certain age).
Personal Device. U acquires a personal trusted computing device DU equipped
both with an input/output user interface and capability to communicate via
a standard short range wireless (SRW) channel (e.g. an NFC-3 or Bluetooth-
enabled cell phone, if suitable as a trusted computing platform, or a small special-
purpose device usable for multi-application IDF prevention and detection.) Any
communication between DU and F, R, or I is over the SRW channel. When R
is an online party in a web-transaction (rather than a physically present point
of sale), then communication between DU and R combines SRW communication
between DU and a PC, and Internet-based communication between this PC and
R. If DU uses NFC to communicate with other devices, then U simply needs to
waive DU before these devices for communication to take place. As a fall-back
measure, when no electronic (e.g. NFC-based) SRW channel can be used by DU
to communicate with other devices, a manual or oral communication channel
may be used, whereby U manually or orally (e.g. in the case of phone-call-based
transactions) communicates information needed or output by DU.
2.3 IDF Detection Protocol
The IDF detection protocol consists of an Initialization protocol and a Transac-
tion protocol. The notation of Table 1 is henceforth used. Table 2 summarizes
the Transaction protocol.
Initialization.
1. I provides U with CU.
2. U appears before (or engages in an audiovisual phone conversation with) F
to allow F to verify that U is who she claims to be.4 This is done using
3 NFC [7] enables wireless communication between devices in very close (e.g. less than
10cm) proximity.
4 Instead, U may visit a trusted representative of F. However, for simplicity, we hence-
forth assume that U visits F.Symbol Explanation
fdig
6
i=1 Length parameters. E.g. d1 ¸ 4, d2 = 160, d3 = 128, 10 ¸ d4 ¸ 5, d5 = 36,
d6 = 72.
n Number (e.g. 10,000) of cred-tokens or pieces of cred-info monitored by F per
user. When F has monitored n transactions for U, Steps A and B of the Fraud
Recovery protocol are executed.
CU Cred-token issued to U by I.
IDU Unique temporary identi¯er assigned to U by F, e.g. a bit string, or U's name
and postal address.
pU d1-digit PIN chosen and memorized by U.
sU d2-bit secret random salts generated by F.
^ pU Symmetric key derived from pU (e.g. ¯rst d3 bits of h(pU)).
h Cryptographic hash function (e.g. SHA-1) with d2-bit image elements.
f MAC (e.g. SHA-1-HMAC) with co-domain elements of same bit length as sU.
k
(j) j
th d2-bit one-time password. k
(n) is a random secret d2-bit string generated by
F. k
(j) = h(sU;k
(j+1)) for j = n ¡ 1;n ¡ 2;¢¢¢;0.
z Transaction details (e.g. timestamp, dollar value, and R's 10-digit phone number).
G Function which, given a d2-bit string (equal to fk(i)(h(z)) in the Transaction
Protocol), constructs a well-formatted d6-bit string allowing R to determine the
issuer I to which G(x) is intended, and such that jG(f0;1g
d2)j is d5 bits. E.g.,
if (a;b) denotes the concatenation of two strings a and b, one can de¯ne G(x) =
(y1;y2;y3;y4), where y1 is a 6-digit identi¯er of I, y3 is a single-digit check code,
and y4 is a 3-digit veri¯cation code such that (y2;y4) = x mod 10
11 and (y1;y2;y3)
is a syntactically-valid credit-card number (CCN); in this case, G(x) is akin to the
concatenation of a 15-digit CCN (y1;y2;y3) with a 3-digit veri¯cation code y4. In
the transaction protocol, G(x) is either manually input by U in a local terminal,
or automatically transferred thereto via NFC as U waives DU before a receiver.
Sz Fraud status issued by F for the transaction associated with z.
Az Receipt issued by I concerning the transaction associated with z.
Table 1. Notational Overview
U DU R I F Messages Sent
1. j Ã j z
2. j Ã j z
2. j ! j pU
3. j ! j (IDU;v), where v = G(fk(i)(h(z)))
4. j ! j (IDU;v;z)
5. j ! j (IDU;h(z);v)
6. j Ã j (IDU;h(z);Sz)
7. j Ã j (h(z);Az)
Table 2. Transaction Fraud Veri¯cation Protocolstandard (e.g. out-of-band) techniques. If F is not convinced of U's identity,
the Initialization procedure is aborted. Otherwise:
3. F generates and provides U with (sU,k(n), n, IDU). F also sets an IDU-
speci¯c counter i to 0.
4. U chooses and memorizes a PIN pU, and inputs (sU,k(n), n, IDU) in DU.
DU generates a d2-bit nonce q, and computes fsU;k(n);qg ^ pU (i.e. symmet-
rically encrypts (sU, k(n), q) with a key ^ pU derived from pU and a secure
symmetric encryption scheme e.g. AES-128 in CBC mode). Then DU stores
the ciphertext locally, sets to 0 a counter i, and erases pU and ^ pU from its
memory.
5. U sends IDU to I, and indicates to I that F monitors CU, and CU must
be paired with IDU. U also provides I with DU's number if DU is a mobile
phone. I links IDU, CU, and DU's number if applicable.
6. I and F (respectively R and I) acquire cryptographic material required
to establish secure channels between each other (e.g. by exchanging each
other's public-key certi¯cate). Throughout the paper, secure channels denote
communication channels providing con¯dentiality, integrity, bi-directional
authenticity, and message-replay protection for a chosen time frame (e.g. by
storing cryptogrpahic hashes of all messages received in the last hour).
Transaction.
1. R sends z to DU.
2. DU displays z to U, and U inputs pU in DU. Let i be the value stored
by DU. DU computes k(i) (see Table 1) and v = G(fk(i)(h(z))). Then, DU
increments i, and sends (IDU;v) to R.
3. Upon receiving (IDU;v), R sends (IDU;v;z) to I, over a secure channel.
4. Upon receiving (IDU;v;z), I sends (IDU;h(z);v) to F, over a secure chan-
nels.
5. Upon receiving (IDU;h(z);v), F uses IDU to retrieve information required
to compute k(i),5 and checks wether v = G(fk(i)(h(z))). Then F computes
the fraud status variable Sz as follows: (a) if v = G(fk(i)(h(z))), F sets
Sz = 0; (b) if v = G(fk(i¡j)(h(z))) for some integer j such that 1 · j ·
d4, then F concludes that U has been impersonated, and sets Sz = 1. (c)
otherwise, F proceeds as follows: (c1) if the values v of tuples (IDU;h(z);v)
received by F have been incorrect for more than a small number of times
(e.g. 5 or 10), within a F-chosen time period, then F concludes that U's
cred-tokens are currently under attack, and F sets Sz = 2;6 (c2) otherwise,
F sets Sz = 3. Then F sends back (IDU;h(z);Sz) to I over the channel
from which (IDU;h(z);v) was just received.
6. Upon receiving (IDU;h(z);Sz), I uses IDU to retrieve CU, and proceeds as
follows: if Sz = 0, I uses CU to process the transaction request (IDU;v;z)
5 e.g. i and k
(n), or i and k
(i+d4) if i + d4 · n and k
(i+d4) was stored by F to speed
up the computation of k
(i).
6 Step 5(c1) requires F to store a counter indicating the number of times the associated
condition has been satis¯ed over a chosen time period. This counter must be set to
0 when Sz is set to 0 or 1 while processing a request associated with IDU.according to I-chosen business rules (e.g. z includes a very recent time stamp
and su±ciently low dollar amount, or, when CROO is used for authentication
only, z is an authentication request including a nonce), and sets Az = 0;
if Sz = 1, I sets Az = 1, and follows a prede¯ned procedure (e.g. I may
directly notify U by calling DU if DU is a mobile phone); if Sz = 2, I sets
Az = 1, and follows another prede¯ned procedure (e.g. I may temporarily
declare all uses of cred-info associated with IDU as fraudulent); if Sz = 3,
I sets Az = 1, and follows yet another prede¯ned procedure (e.g. I may not
do anything). Then I sends (h(z);Az) to R using the channel from which
(IDU;h(z);v) was sent.
7. Upon receiving (h(z);Az), R proceeds as follows: if Az = 0, R provides
U with the expected goods or services; otherwise, R noti¯es U that the
transaction was not successful, and issues a receipt to U mentioning that
the given transaction failed.
Fraud Recovery. Upon suspecting that she has been impersonated,7 U either
phones or goes to F in person. Then, the following steps A and B are executed.
(A) F veri¯es U's claimed identity (e.g. using out-of-band procedures),8 and
proceeds as follows. (B) F resets U's counter i to 0; U obtains new (sU,k(n),
n) from F, and chooses and memorizes a new pU; DU generates a d2-bit nonce
q, computes fsU;k(n);qg ^ pU and stores the result on DU; DU also sets to 0 the
counter i, and erases pU and ^ pU from its memory.
2.4 Concrete Examples of CROO
Driver's License. A real-world instantiation of CROO could be as follows: I is a
state agency that issues drivers' licences; R is a bank; U is a person to whom I
issues a driver's licence CU; F is a state agency that specializes in the detection of
fraud involving state-issued cred-tokens; DU is a cell phone communicating with
electronic door locks via NFC. (When validation of driver's licence information
(e.g. for credit card issuing) does not currently involve online check with a trusted
party, this instantiation of our (online) proposal may be used to better detect
driver's license-related IDF.)
Credit Card. As a second example, CROO can be instantiated with the following
parties: I is a credit card company; R is an online merchant; U is a legitimate
customer of I to whom I issues a credit card CU; F is a credit bureau; and DU is
a cell phone equipped with a software application facilitating web-based online
commerce via PCs; transaction details (e.g. dollar amount and R's identi¯er)
are manually input by U into DU; DU displays v, and U manually inputs v
(formatted as a credit card number with a 3-digit veri¯cation code) into a local
PC used for web transactions.
7 Such suspicion may come to U from reviewing personal transaction reports.
8 If fraud recovery is initiated more than a prede¯ned number of times in a given
time-frame, F may engage in more thorough authentication of U (e.g. via in-person
thorough interviews by representatives of F).2.5 Extensions
CROO is °exible with respect to the number of credential issuers I and the number
of fraud detection parties F. In other words, U may have cred-tokens issued
by di®erent parties I, and these parties may rely on di®erent fraud detecting
parties F. For example, fraud detecting parties may be peculiar to particular
applications or contexts (e.g. ¯nancial or government-oriented services). In some
cases, however, it may be simpler to associate all the cred-tokens of a user with
a single fraud detecting party, even though this party might not be the same
for all users (e.g. for scalability purposes). The advantage of using a single fraud
detecting party for all cred-tokens of a user is that when fraud is committed with
any of this user's cred-tokens, this instance of fraud is detected the next time
the user utilizes any of its cred-tokens. This is due to the fact that each one-
time password is not bound with a particular cred-token, but with a user and
the party that validates this OTP. In other words, one-time passwords are used
across cred-tokens and cred-info thereon. Another extension of CROO consists in
asking users (say U) to memorize di®erent PINs for di®erent groups of cred-
tokens; if a PIN is guessed by an attacker, the cred-tokens associated with PINs
that have not been guessed may still be used by U, and the OTPs associated
with the non-guessed PINs are not temporarily declared as fraudulent.
3 Evaluation Criteria for Universal ID Fraud Solutions
This section discusses evaluation properties for analysis and comparison of the
proposed CROO protocol (henceforth denoted S, for scheme) with others. We
are primarily interested in conveying an understanding of S's usability, privacy,
and security characteristics (using practical criteria presented below), rather
than algebraically \proving" the security of S. Security- and privacy-related
requirements of CROO are discussed in an extended version of this paper [24], as
well as a preliminary mathematical security analysis of a simpli¯ed version of
CROO. Devising realistic mathematical models and formal proofs which provide
tangible guarantees in real-world deployments remains a challenge for us and
others [16,15].
We aim to provide criteria that can be used to evaluate the e®ectiveness of
the proposed IDF detection scheme. We consider criteria under four categories:
usability, privacy-preserving capability (i.e. ability of users to control access to
their cp-info), fraud detection capability (i.e. capability to detect IDF attempts
or cases in which IDF has been committed without being detected), and commu-
nication security (e.g. protection against man-in-the-middle attacks). Presented
below, these criteria are not exhaustive, but rather what we hope is a useful step
towards an accepted set of criteria to evaluate universal IDF solutions.
The following notation is used: I is any legitimate credential issuer; U is a
user (person); xU is a cred-token or cred-info issued by I to a person believed
to be U; xU* denotes xU and/or any clones thereof; and R is a (relying) party
whose goal is either to verify claims made by, or provide goods/services to, any
party A, provided A demonstrates knowledge of appropriate secret information,or shows possession of certain cred-tokens or cred-info that are both valid and
not °agged as fraudulent. Moreover, terms denoted by y can further be quali¯ed
by \instantly" or \within some useful time period".
Notation 3 (resp. 7) indicates that S meets (resp. does not meet) the asso-
ciated criterion. Notation 37 indicates that the associated criterion is partially
met by S. Due to space limitations, details of the evaluation claims are presented
in an extended version of this paper [24].
Usability Evaluation Criteria
3 U1. No Requirement to Memorize Multiple Passwords. S does not require
U to memorize cred-token-speci¯c or application-speci¯c passwords.
37 U2. No Requirement to Acquire Extra Devices. S does not require U to
acquire extra devices (e.g. computers, cell phones, memory drives).9
37 U3. No Requirement for Users to Carry Extra Devices. S does not require
U to carry extra personal devices (e.g. cell phone).
37 U4. Easy Transition from Current Processes. S does not require U to sig-
ni¯cantly change current processes to which U is accustomed (e.g. by not
requiring extra mental or dexterous e®ort from U). For example, U is likely
used to entering a PIN when using bank cards (vs. having an eye scanned).
3 U5. Support for Online Transactions. S detects instances of attempted
and/or committed but previously undetected IDF for online (e.g. web) trans-
actions.
3 U6. Support for On-Site Transactions. S detects instances of attempted
and/or committed but previously undetected IDF for on-site (e.g. point-of-
sale) transactions.
3 U7. Convenience of Fraud Flagging Procedures. When IDF has been de-
tected (e.g. by a user or system), S provides a convenient mechanism to °ag
the appropriate cred-tokens as fraudulent. For example, S may enable U to
interact with only one party to °ag, as fraudulent, any of her cred-tokens.
3 U8. Suitability for Fixed Users. S can be used by ¯xed users (i.e. who carry
out transactions from a constant geographic location).
3 U9. Convenience of Fraud Recovery Procedures. When U su®ers IDF, S al-
lows U to easily recover. For example, S may enable U to interact with only
one party to obtain new cred-tokens that can be used thereafter, without
having to obtain new cred-tokens from a number of credential issuers. Alter-
natively, S may enable U to interact with only one party that allows her to
both continue to use her cred-tokens, and have the assurance that the use
of any clones of her cred-tokens will be detected as fraudulent.
7 U10. Support for Transactions Involving O®-line Relying Parties. S detects
instances of attempted and/or committed but previously undetected IDF
even if R is not able to communicate, in real time, with other parties (e.g. I
and F).
7 U11. Support for Use of Multiple Credentials in a Single Transaction. S
enables the use of multiple pieces of cred-info in a single transaction.
9 S may require U to load new software on an existing general-purpose device (e.g.
cell phone).Privacy Evaluation Criteria
37 P1. No Disclosure of User Location. S does not disclose U's location in-
formation, e.g. to multiple entities, or an entity that shares it with other
parties.
37 P2. No Disclosure of User Activity. S does not disclose transaction details
regarding U's activity (e.g. what U has bought, and when or where this was
done).
3 P3. No Disclosure of User Capabilities. S does not reveal what hardware or
software capabilities (e.g. digital camera or printer) U has.
3 P4. No Disclosure of User's Private Information. S does not reveal private
(e.g. medical or ¯nancial) user information.
Fraud Detection Evaluation Criteria
3 D1. Determination of Credential Use. U and I knowy when xU* is used.
3 D2. Control on Credential Use. U and I can controly the use of xU* (i.e.
approve or reject each use thereof).
3 D3. Detection of Illegitimate Credential Holder. When xU* is presented to
R, then U, I, and R can determine whether xU*'s holder is authorized to
hold xU*. This credential holder legitimacy check might be based on the
possession of a speci¯ed token, the knowledge of a memorized secret, the
presentation of inherent biometric features, the proof of current geographic
location, or some other criterion.
37 D4. Determination of Credential Use Context. U and I can determiney in
which context (e.g. R's identity, network location, and geographic location)
xU* is used.10
37 D5. Veri¯cation of R's Entitlement to View Credential. U and I can determiney
whether R is a party to which xU* is authorized to be shown for speci¯ed
purposes (e.g. the delivery of cred-tokens, goods, or services).
3 D6. Entitlement Veri¯cation of Credential Holder's Claimed ID. R and I can
determiney whether xU* is associated with its holder's claimed identity.11
3 D7. Fraud Flagging of Credentials. S allows authorized parties (e.g. U and
I) to °ag xU as fraudulent (i.e. indicate in a trusted accessible database that,
for a speci¯ed period, all uses of xU* are fraudulent).
3 D8. Veri¯cation of Credential Fraud Flag. R can know whether xU* is cur-
rently °agged as fraudulent.
3 D9.Detection of Clone Usage. R (resp. I) can distinguishy xU from its clones
whenever the latter are presented to R (resp. I).
7 D10. Detection of Credential Cloning. U and I can detecty that xU* is
cloned.
7 D11. Detection of Credential Theft. U and I can detecty that xU is stolen
from U.
3 D12. Determination of Malicious Fraud Claims. I can determiney whether
U is honest when claiming that xU* has been used without proper autho-
rization.
10 Note that this criterion may adversely a®ect user privacy.
11 For example, xU*'s holder may claim to be Joe Dalton while xU* was issued to
Lucky Luke. This is di®erent from the situation in which xU's holder pretends to be
Lucky Luke (see D3).Communication Security Evaluation Criteria
3 C1. Protection Against Physical Exposure of xU*. S protects xU* from being
visually captured (e.g. via shoulder sur¯ng) by unauthorized parties, without
requiring U's conscious cooperation.
3 C2. Protection Against Digital Exposure of xU*. If xU* is cred-info, S pro-
tects xU* from being accessed by unauthorized parties using computer sys-
tems. For example, S may protect xU* from being captured in an intelligible
form when xU* is communicated over untrusted channels (e.g. the Internet).
3 C3. Protection Against Replay Attacks. S prevents (or reduces to a negligible
proportion) reuse of electronic messages sent to impersonate U.
3 C4. Protection Against Man-In-The-Middle Attacks. S prevents (or reduces
to a negligible proportion) impersonation of U through tampering or injec-
tion of messages between parties used by S.
7 C5. Protection Against Denial of Service Attacks. S prevents (or reduces to
a negligible proportion) denial of services against U.
Speci¯c applications may require that subsets of the proposed criteria be met
(as best as possible), but universal IDF solutions may be required to meet many
or even all criteria. For practical purposes, instant detection of credential cloning
and theft (see D10 and D11) might be optional for universal IDF solutions; the
existence of cloned cred-tokens may be more di±cult to detect (with current
technologies) than their use.
Based on the above criteria, CROO is expected12 to provide usability bene-
¯ts for both users and relying parties; to detect IDF attempts; to identify cases
of committed yet previously undetected IDF; and to be resistant to a number
of communication-based attacks (e.g. replay and man-in-the-middle attacks, in-
cluding phishing and PC-based key logging). Two limitations of CROO are: its
inability to detect cases in which legitimate users perform transactions, and later
repudiate them; and susceptibility to denial of service attacks against speci¯c
users, by attackers who have gathered su±cient and correct credential informa-
tion.
4 Related Work and Comparison
The design of CROO involves consideration for various aspects including: IDF de-
tection (before and after fraud); limitation of IDF consequences; methodological
generality (universality); device capture resilience; and deployability. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, we review work related to these aspects. A more extensive
literature review is presented in an extended version of this paper [24].
Password-based Authentication. Static password schemes,13 one-time pass-
word (OTP) schemes [18], password schemes resilient to shoulder sur¯ng attacks
12 This design-level paper considers a number of theoretical and practical issues of
IDF detection. We have not empirically con¯rmed our usability analysis through a
prototype implementation, user lab, or ¯eld tests. This is left for future work.
13 Including commonplace typed textual password mechanisms, and strengthened pass-
word schemes [1].[12,27], and schemes generating domain-speci¯c passwords from a combination
of single user-chosen passwords and multiple domain-speci¯c keys [26,11] can all
be used to authenticate users and thereby solve parts of the problem of phishing
and/or IDF. Our scheme can be viewed as a careful combination of known and
modi¯ed tools and techniques (e.g. cell phones, non-veri¯able text [19], OTP-
based authentication, and symmetric and asymmetric cryptography) to detect
IDF.
Limited-Use Credit Card Numbers. Rubin and Wright [28] propose a scheme
for o®-line generation of limited-use (e.g. one-time) credit card (CC) numbers.
While similar in some ways, CROO is universal, and is designed to counter device
capture attacks (through the use of PIN-encrypted unveri¯able keys). Singh and
dos Santos [30] describe another scheme for o®-line generation of limited-use cre-
dentials. Unlike our scheme, Singh and dos Santos' is not meant to be universal
and counter device capture attacks. Shamir [29] describes a scheme to generate
one-time CC numbers via an online interactive procedure whereby CC hold-
ers obtain these numbers from CC issuers. The number-generation procedure in
Shamir's scheme can be automated using a plugin installed on user PCs. This
does not (and is not meant to) counter attacks whereby users' browsers or PCs
are compromised e.g. via PC-based virus infection or key-logging attacks. Mol-
loy et al. [23] propose a scheme for o®-line generation of limited-use credit card
numbers; their scheme is susceptible to dictionary attacks on user passwords.
Limiting the E®ect of Cryptographic Key Exposure. Public-key schemes
[5] have been proposed to limit the e®ect of key exposure by decreasing the odds
that unauthorized public-key signatures be issued. Just and van Oorschot [13]
suggest a method to detect fraudulent cryptographic signatures. CROO addresses
the more general problem of IDF committed with cloned cred-info.
Device Capture Resilience. The idea of capture resilience was suggested by
Mackenzie et al. [20] to detect attempts of o®-line password-guessing attacks on
password-protected mobile devices, by requiring password-based user-to-device
authentication to be mediated (and, ergo, detectable) by online servers. In ad-
dition to di®erences in the way user passwords are generated in CROO and these
schemes, CROO generates, for easier deployability, user credentials which can be
formatted as existing, typically low-entropy credentials (e.g. credit card num-
bers), while the aforementioned capture-resilient schemes use either high-entropy
cryptographic keys or public-key encrypted PINs as user credentials.
OTP-Generating Tokens. Various companies (e.g. Aladdin, RSA and Mas-
tercard) have developed variants of a scheme whereby hardware tokens or mobile
device software are used to generate OTPs which are then manually input into
PCs, in cleartext form, for remote user authentication and/or transaction autho-
rization. Existing variants of this scheme are not (and not meant to be) simul-
taneously universal, usable without a vendor-speci¯c hardware token, resilient
to device capture, and immune to phishing and PC-based key-logging attacks
whereby OTPs are copied and then used for unintended transactions.
IDF Detection via Location Corroboration and Personal Devices. Van
Oorschot and Stubblebine [31] propose an IDF detection scheme for on-site trans-actions, whereby users' identity claims are corroborated with trusted claims of
these users' location. Mannan and van Oorschot [21] propose an authentication
protocol involving an independent personal device, and survey related schemes.
SET and Certi¯cate-Based PKIs. SET [10] allows credit card (CC) holders
to obtain goods or services from merchants without revealing their CC informa-
tion to the latter. SET is not designed to be used for multiple classes of cred-
tokens, nor does it specify methods to identify cases of committed yet undetected
IDF. SET also employs user-speci¯c (i.e. CC holder) private keys in a certi¯cate-
based public-key infrastructure (PKI); we favor the use of OTPs as user authen-
tication secrets, mostly because their misuse can be subsequently detected and
their misuse detection does not call for an associated noti¯cation to a potentially
large population of parties relying on the validity of public-key certi¯cates as-
sociated with compromised signing keys. SET also uses high-entropy user-keys,
whereas, for easier deployability, CROO allows to format user-credentials as exist-
ing low-entropy credentials.
5 Concluding Remarks
We address the general problem of IDF. We propose criteria to characterize and
compare instances of IDF, providing a framework to evaluate IDF solutions by
examining the usability, privacy-preserving capability, fraud detection capabil-
ity, and communication security of these solutions. We argue that complete IDF
solutions should provide mechanisms that detect the use of compromised pri-
vate credential information. Our proposed scheme (CROO) implements this idea
without requiring the collection of private behavioral information (in contrast to
statistical anomaly-based fraud detection schemes used, e.g., by banks to detect
credit card fraud). CROO associates each use of credential information with a one-
time password veri¯ed by an online trusted party F. F need not be the same for
all users (thus improving scalability). An important feature of CROO is its uni-
versal nature, i.e. it is designed to simultaneously be used with multiple classes
of applications and credential tokens, in both online and on-site transactions.
CROO's user credentials can be formatted as existing user credentials, thereby
making potentially easier the adoption of the proposed scheme. CROO also al-
lows each IDF victim to continue to use her credential tokens (e.g. credit cards)
provided she uses her portable trusted device to send new one-time password
setup information to F. This feature can be useful when it is preferable (e.g.
for time e±ciency, convenience, or lack of alternative options) to continue to use
credential tokens, even though they have been cloned, rather than obtaining new
ones. This is appealing in cases in which it takes less time to go in person to a
single local party F (e.g. a trusted government agency's o±ce) to give new OTP
setup information, than having social security numbers replaced, or obtaining
new credit cards by postal mail. We encourage work on mathematical models
that help evaluate IDF detection schemes, but note the challenge of generating
realistic models (particularly for universal schemes). We also encourage further
exploration in the design of schemes that detect fraudulent uses of compromised
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